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Speaking to Africa 
The Early Success 
of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone 
Noah B. Novogrodsky* 
I. Introduction 
After a decade of civil war marked by appalling human rights abuses, Sierra 
Leone has embraced not one, but two transitional justice experiments - a recently 
concluded truth and reconciliation commission l and a series of criminal 
prosecutions. The concurrent operation of the truth commission and the 
international trials has given rise to a significant body of scholarship addressing the 
problems of sequencing, confusion, objectives and the use of evidence before the 
two institutions.2 
• Director of the International Human Rights Program and_Adjunct Professor at the University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law, and Visiting Professor at Georgetown University Law Center. This 
paper was originally presented in Prof. Beth Van Schaack's Transitional Justice Workshop at 
Santa Clara University School of Law. I am indebted to Prof. Beth Van Schaack for the 
invitation to share these ideas and for her helpful comments. I am also grateful to Mathew 
Goldstein for exemplary research assistance and to Mora Johnson and Kathryn Howarth whose 
work at the Special Court and comments on the tribunal influenced my thinking. 
I. The truth and reconciliation commission was established with the goal of creating an 
"impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international 
humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone." See The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 art. 6(1), Feb. 10, 2000, available at 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcbook-TRCAct.html. 
2. The phenomenon ofa criminal tribunal operating alongside a truth commission and the 
potential role for each instrument has been addressed by the commission and various legal 
scholars. See Elizabeth M. Evenson, Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination 
Between Commission and Special COllrt, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (2004) (exploring the 
operation challenges associated with each institution). See also William A. Schabas, The 
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Far less attention has been paid to the actual operation of the two entities. The 
focus of this article is the legacy of three early decisions of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone and their potentially transcendent impact on other African conflicts. 
Between March and June 2004, the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued a trinity 
of jurisdictional opinions addressing the recruitment of child soldiers, the effect of 
a domestic amnesty on subsequent intemational prosecutions, and the status of 
head of state immunity. 3 A hybrid tribunal established by the United Nations and 
the Govemment of Sierra Leone, thc Court was created to try thosc who "bcar thc 
greatcst responsibility" for scrious violations ofintemational humanitarian law 
eommittcd during the country's civil war aftcr November 1996." The Special 
Court employs individual criminal accountability as a means of promoting 
transitional justicc and the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Whether by fortune or 
design, however, the Special Court's early decisions have particular resonance for 
Africa as a whole and echo well beyond the modest effort unfolding in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone. 
This paper argues that the Special Court is fashioning a new institutional model 
that draws on the strengths of intemationalized proceedings while maintaining 
local relevance and legitimacy. By addressing the crimes of Sierra Leoneans and 
foreigners alike, the Special Court has mediated intcmational and local imperatives 
to create a hybrid entity that, while speaking predominantly to forcigners, blends 
local, regional and intemational dimensions. 
Relationship Between Truth Commissions and [ntemational Courts: The Case oj'Sierra 
Leone, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 1035 (2003); Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementwy and 
Con{lictinR Relationship Between the Special Court {or Sierra Leone and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 139, 154-55 (2003); Marieke 
Wierde, Priscilla Hayner & Paul van Zyl, Exploring the Relationship Between the Special 
Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, 2002 INT'L CTR. FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUST., available at http://www.ictj.orglimages/contentlO/8/084.pdf. 
3. Recruitment is defined in Article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone as 
H[ c ]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into anned forces or groups 
using them to participate actively in hostilities." The implication of this Article is that a 
child under the age of fifteen cannot meaningfully consent to enlist or participate in anllcd 
conflict. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Geneml on the Establishment o{ a 
Special Court/or Sierra Leone, annex, delivered to the Security Coullcil, U.N. Doc. 
S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000) [hereinafter Special Court for Sierra Leone]. 
4. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment ofa Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16,2002, available at 
http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html. 
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II. Background 
Already desperately poor and badly misgoverned, Sierra Leone empted in a fuB 
fledged civil war in March 199 I when guerillas calling themselves the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded the country from neighboring Liberia.5 
RUF leader Foday Sankoh had met then-Liberian rebel commander Charles Taylor 
'" in Libya and the two leaders coordinated attacks, exchanged weapons and shared 
tactics that would redefine bmtality in West Africa.6 
The ensuing war was characterized by grave human rights abuses committed by 
rebels and government-affiliated troops alike. Over a ten-year period, armed units 
in Sierra Leone kidnapped mral populations, extracted forced labor in diamond 
mines and created more than a million refugees.7 Before the war was over, the 
RUF and Government forces were joined in the conflict by the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council, mercenary armies - including the South African headed 
firm "Executive Outcomes" - several regional and UN peacekeeping collections 
and a militia known as the Civilian Defence Forees.8 In all, more than 50,000 
people were killed.9 Thousands more were abducted and forced into sexual 
slavery, unwanted marriages and domestic servitude. 10 Countless children were 
killed in the fighting; many who survived were severely damaged by their 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
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The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Report blamed past misgovernance for the 
instability that augured the worst human rights violations. See Priscilla Hayner, The Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Reviewing Its First Year, 2004 INT'L CTR. 
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., available at http://www.ictj.org/imagcs/contentll/0!100.pd( 
Jamie O'Connell, Here Interest A<feets Humanity: How to End the War and Support 
Reconstruction ill Liberia and the Modest Case for American Leadership, 17 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 207 (2004). Taylor is believed to have supported the invasion of Sierra Leone to 
gain access to Sierra Leonean diamonds, to increase his influence in the subregion and 
because he condemned the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) for 
using Sierra Leone as a base for its armed support of the National Unity Govemment in 
Liberia that Taylor was bent on destroying. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, SIERRA LEONE: TIME 
FORA NEW MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGY, at ii (2001), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1491&1=1. 
See Renerally PAUL RICHARDS, FIGHTING FOR THE RAIN FOREST: WAR, YOUTH AND 
RESOURCES IN SIERRA LEONE (1996). 
SowinR Terror: Atrocities AKainst Civilians in Sierra Leone, 10 HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sierra/; "We 'Il Kill You If YOII Oy": Sexual 
Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict, 15 HUM. RTS. WATCH (2003), available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraieone/sierieonO I 03. pdf. 
BBC, Report on War ill Sierra Leone, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl\lhi/woridlafrica/country yrofiles/I 061561.stm. 
See Child Soldiers Newsletter: Sierra Leolle: War-Related Sexual Abuse, 3 COAL. TO STOP 
THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS 2 (2002), available aLhttp://www.chiid-
soidiers.org/document_get. ph p?id=677 . 
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experiences. II 
Desperate to quiet the conflict, the Government of Sierra Leone entered into a 
short-lived agreement with the warring factions in 1996 in Abidjan. The failure of 
that accord was followed by an agreement between the Government and the RUF 
signed in Lome, Togo on July 7, 1999. That agreement sought to end the war and 
called for the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission to address past 
crimes. Significantly, the Lome Accord provided a blanket amnesty for 
perpetrators of the atrocities committed in the course of the war.12 Foday 
Sankoh,\3 received an individual pardon in the Lome Agreement as well as the 
position of Minister for Mining in the future government of Sierra Leone.14 
International observers, represented by the United Nations, the Commonwealth, 
ECOW AS and the Organisation of African Unity endorsed the aceord as "moral 
guarantors," although, the United Nations Secretary-General's Special 
Representative appended a reservation to his signature insisting that amnesty could 
not apply to crimes against humanity and war crimes. ls 
Almost immediately, the cease-fire recognized in the Lome Accord fell apart 
and fighting resumed. The RUF and other groups attacked UN peacekeepers in 
Sierra Leone and in 2000, armed combatants took nearly 500 foreign troops 
hostage.1 6 In May 2000, British Special Forces, acting at the request of the 
Government of Sierra Leone, freed the hostages and arrested Foday Sankoh.
17 
Notwithstanding the domestic amnesty of the previous year, the Government of 
Sierra Leone then wrote to the UN Secretary-General requesting the establishment 
II. Sowing Terror: Atrocities AgaillSt Civilians in Sierra Leone, supra note 9; see also Sierra 
Leone: Childhood -.A CaSlialty 0/ COI1jlict, 2000 AMNESTY INT'L11-14 availa?le at 
http:web.anmcsty.org/aidoc/aidocydf.nsf/lndex/ AFR51 0692000ENG LlS~V$Fllel AFR510 
6900.pdf. 
12. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone, art. IX, July 7, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/19991777, available at 
http://www.sierra-Ieone.org/lomeaccord.html[hereinafter Lom~ Accord]. 
13. Id. at art. IX. Foday Sankoh was a leada and founder of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF), which started the Sierra Leonean civil war in which between 50,000 and 200,000 
pcople were killed. Sankoh was indicted on 17 counts for various war crimes, including 
crimes against humanity, rape, sexual slavery and extermination, but died in 2003 while 
awaiting trial at the Special Court. Obituary, Sierra Leone Rebel Leader Dies, BBe NEWS, 
July 30, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi/africal3109521.stm. 
14. Lome Accord, supra note 13, at arts. Vll., IX. 
15. The Secretary-Gen~ral, Sevelllh Report (}(the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, '17, delivered to the Security COllncil, U.N. Doc. 
S/1999/836 (July 30, 1999). 
16. Laura R. Hall & Nahal Kazemi, Prospects /01' Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone, 
44 HARV. INT'L LJ. 287, 289 (2003); Evenson, supra not<:: 3, at 737-38. 
17. Evenson, supra note 3, at 738. 
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of an international tribunal to bring RUF leaders to trial. 18 Security Council 
Resolution 1315 recalled the reservation of the Special Representative at Lome and 
authorized the Secretary-General to begin negotiations to establish a Special Court 
for Sierra Leone. 19 On January 16,2002, the United Nations and the Government 
of Sierra Leone entered into an agreement to establish the Special Court to 
prosecute "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law committed 
within the territory of Sierra Leone."zo 
III. Three Jurisdictional Rulings 
A. Amnesty 
The first, and perhaps most politically controversial, of the Court's 
jurisdictional decisions concerned the potentially preclusive effect on the Special 
Court of prior amnesties provided to Morris Kallonz1 and Brima Bazzy Kamara.22 
Kallon and Kamara's counsel filed preliminary motions arguing that the 
Government of Sierra Leone was bound to observe the amnesty agreement it 
entered into with the RUF in July 1999 and, alternatively, even if the Court could 
18. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the President of the Security 
Council, Aug. 9, 2000, annex, U.N. Doc. S/20001786 (Aug. 10,2000) [hereinafter Letter]. 
19. S.C. Res. 1315, ~ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RESIl315 (2000). 
20. Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 4, at ~ 1. 
21. "Morris Kallon, aka Bilai Karim, alleged to have been a former commander of the 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, was indicted on March 7, 2003, on a 17-count 
indictment for crimes against humanity, violations of Articlc 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law (an 18th count was later added)." Summary of Charges against the RUF 
Accused - Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.orgIRUFcasesummary.htmI 
(last visited Aug. 13,2006); see Prosecutor v. Sessay, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT, 
Amended Consolidated Indictment (Mar. 13,2004), available at http://www.sc-
sl.orglRUF.html (follow "first" part and "second" part hyperlinks under "Indictment"). 
22. "Brima Bazzy Kamara, aka Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara, aka Alhaji Ibrahim Kamara, is alleged 
to have been a senior member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. He was indicted 
on 28 May 2003 on a 17-count indictment for crimes against humanity, violations of Article 
3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (commonly known as 
war crimes), and other serious violations ofintemational humanitarian law (an 18th count 
was later added; four counts were subsequently dropped)." AFRC Accused Case Summary 
- Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.orglAFRCcasesummary.html (last 
198 
visited Aug. 13,2006); see Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further 
Amended Consolidated Indictment (Feb. 18,2005), available at http://www.sc-
sl.orglAFRC.htmI (follow "Indictment" hyperlink under "Indictment"). 
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examine pre-1999 activity, it would be an abuse of international legal process to do 
SO.23 Fellow accused Moinina Fofana and Augustine Gbao intervened in support 
of the motions.24 
Because Kallon and Kamara were indicted on charges alleging the commission 
of grave abuses before July 1999, the Court was immediately confronted by a 
direct challenge to the adjudication of half of its temporal mandate.25 
The Court's decision pivoted on its characterization of Article IX of the Lome 
Agreement and the related finding that the Special Court is an international 
tribunal. Paragraph three of Article IX to the Lome Agreement provides that: 
To consolidate peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of 
Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of 
the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of 
their objectives as members of those organisations since March 1991, up to the signing of 
the present Agreement.26 
The defendants argued that the purpose of the Lome Agreement was inherently 
incompatible with the existence of the Special Court. Specifically, counsel for 
Kallon and Kamara sought to hold the Government of Sierra Leone to its previous 
bargain and argued that it was arbitrary and illegal of the UN and the Government 
of Sierra Leone to appear to honour the earlier Abidjan Peace Agreement (by 
founding the Special Court's temporal jurisdiction on the date of that accord) but 
not the Lome Agreement. The defense claimed that because the Government of 
Sierra Leone was a party to both the Lome Agreement and the treaty creating the 
Special Court, it could not void its previous commitment. 
The Court disagreed and found that Article IX of the Lome Agreement 
addressed and could have legal force with respect to the national courts of Sierra 
Leone only. "The Lome Agreement cannot be characterised as an international 
instrument," the Court declared.27 Accordingly, the Court held that (i) "the 
23. Summary of Decision to on Challenge to Jurisdiction - Lome Accord Amnesty -13 March 
2004 - Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/summary-SCSL-04-15-PT-
060.html (last visited Aug. 13,2006). 
24. !d 
25. The Statue of the Special Court for Sierra Leone grants the Tribunal temporal jurisdiction 
over crimes committed since November 30, 1996. Statute ofthe Special Court for Sierra 
Leone art. I, Aug. 14,2000, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/documents.htrnl (follow 
hyperlink "Statute of the Special Court, annexed to the Agreement (16 January 2002)") 
[hereinafter Statute of the Special Court]. 
26. Lome Accord, supra note 13, at art. IX, ~ 3. 
27. Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to 
Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty, '142 (Mar. 13,2004), available at http://www.sc-
sl.orglRUF.html (follow "Decisions" hyperlink under "Decisions"). 
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amnesty granted by Sierra Leone cannot cover crimes under international law that 
are the subject of universal jurisdiction,,,28 and (ii) that it did not bind future 
international criminal bodies. States cannot use domestic legislation, the Court 
found, to bar international criminal liability. 
The Court's amnesty decision is rooted in the ICTY's decision in Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija, in which thc Yugoslav Tribunal found that a domestic amnesty law 
does not prevent prosecution for thejus cogens offense of torture before the ICTY 
or indeed in any other foreignjurisdiction.29 Applied to this case, the COllrt 
suggested that Article IX of the Lome Accord was a part of the municipal law of 
Sierra Leone but had no effect on the Special Court. Just as Azapo v. President of 
the Republic ojSouth Ajrica30 confinned the validity of amnesties provided by the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission with respect to the domestic 
laws of South Africa, the Kallon Court acknowledged a role for the Lome 
Agreement while limiting its impact on the Special Court. 
In deciding the case on the grounds of universal jurisdiction for certain crimes, 
the Kallon Court eschewed primary reliance on either the positivist argument that 
it hadjursidction because the Court's statute so provides,3\ or the claim that the 
SRSG's disclaimer invalidated part of the Lome Agreement. 
Equally important, the Court offered an historical analysis of the conflict and 
divided its characterization of the Sierra Leonean civil war into three phases: (i) a 
period of anned conflict, (ii) a peace agreement phase, and (iii) a justice phase 
which involved "separating what is in the exclusive domain of the municipal 
authority to be resolved under municipal law from what is in the concurrent 
jurisdiction of that authority and other international community to be resolved by 
application purely of internationallaw.,,32 In order to strengthen its role in the so-
called third phase, the Court cited President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's letter of 12 
June 2000 to the President of the Security Council in which he observes that 
"Lately, [the RUF leadership] have abducted over 500 United Nations 
peacekeepers and seized their arms, weapons and unifonns, and even killed some 
peacekeepers. This is in spite of a provision in the Lome Peace Agreement itself 
requiring both my Government and the RUF to ensure the safety of these 
28. Jd. aql71. 
29. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, '1155 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
30. Azanian People's Org. (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic afS. Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 
(CC) (S. Afr.). 
31. Statute of the Special Court, supra note 26, at art. X. 
32. Prosecutor v. KaHan, slipra note 26 at paras 16-19. 
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peacekeepers. ,,33 
B. The Recruitmellt oj Child Soldiers 
The second of the Court's rulings addresses the criminality of recruiting child 
soldiers under customary international law. The decision in the case of Sam Hinga 
Norman finds that Norman may be prosecuted for the crime of enlisting children 
under the age of fifteen into armed forces or groups and of using them to 
participate actively in hostilities.34 
Norman, who is among the first defendants to appear before the Special Court, 
is the former leader of the Civil Defence Forces, a pro-government militia group 
comprised predominantly of traditional hunters known as Kamajors. The 
Indictment issued against Norman and others accuses him of systematically 
pressing small boys into armed combat. 
In that, the Indictment reflects a defining feature of the decade-long Sierra 
Leonean civil war in which more than 10,000 children served as child soldiers in 
the country's three major armed forces: the Revolutionary United Front, the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council, and the CDF.35 
Norman challenged the Court's subject matter jurisdiction by moving to dismiss 
the charges relating to child recruitment on the grounds that recruiting child 
soldiers was not a crime under customary international law at the times relevant to 
the indictment (between 1996 and 2001).36 Norman submitted that while 
international instruments, such as Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, may have prohibited 
the recruitment of child soldiers, these instruments did not affix any criminal 
responsibility to such activity.3? Furthermorc, Norman argued, if child recruitment 
ever amounted to an international crime, it would only be after the Rome Statute of 
33. Letter, supra note 19, at annex. 
34. Prosecutor v. Sam Binga Nonnan, Moinina Fofana, Allicu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-
2004-14-PT (11-21), Amended Indictment, Count 8 (Feb. 5, 2004). For more detailed 
analysis of the Nonnan decision, see Noah Novogrodsky & Mathew Goldstein, Small Steps: 
Prosecliting The Recl'lIitmelll of Child Soldiers - the Case of Sam llinga Norman, 
15(3) INTERIGHTS' BULL. ,May 2006. 
35. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Annex to the Protection of Children 
Af/ected by Armed Conflict: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary -General 
for Children and Armed Cot!/lict, '1131, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/430 (1999). 
36. Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Nonnan, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-PT, Defense Preliminary 
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction: Child Recntitment, at 3, available at http://www.se-
sl.orgiDoeuments/SCSL-04-14-AR 72(E)-131-7383.pdf. 
37. Id 
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the International Criminal Court of 1998 - not before.38 
In a three to one decision, the Special Court rejected Norman's preliminary 
motion.39 The Court held that the offence under Article 4(c) of its Statute, 
"[ c ]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into anned forces or 
groups using them to participate actively in hostilities ("child recruitment")," does 
not violate the international legal prohibition on retroactive criminal liability 
(milium crimen sine lege), and that Norman was properly charged with a grave 
breach of humanitarian law.40 The Court found that the prohibition against 
recruiting child soldiers had crystallized into a crime under customary international 
law before November 1996, and that, accordingly, individuals may be prosecuted 
for this offence at any time under the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court41 • 
In dissent, Judge Robertson distinguished conscription from enlistment, arguing 
that individual criminal responsibility did not attach to the offense of enlistment 
until the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court was adopted in July 
1998.42 
The impact of the majority's decision in Norman is profound. The 
jurisdictional ruling provides content to customary law nonns, attaches individual 
criminal sanctions to the practice of recruiting child soldiers and applies the newly 
crystallized rule retroactively to capture a defining feature of the war. In that, 
Norman invokes the Nuremberg precedent through which the International 
Military Tribunal found that: 
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states 
which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from general principles of justice 
applied by jurists, and practiced by military courts. This law is not static, but by continual 
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world.43 
38. See generally id. 
39. Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on 
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), at 7383-409 (June 
14,2004). 
40. ld. at ~ 17. 
41. Under author's direction, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law International Human 
Rights Clinic (IHRC) submitted an amicus brief in the Norman case in November 2003, 
available at 
http://www.law.utoronto.calvisitors _ content.asp?itemPath= 5/ 12/3/0/0&contentId=879. The 
IlIRC's submission will soon be published in 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L LJ. (forthcoming), and is 
currently available online. 
42. See generally Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E) at 
7413-47. In Robertson's view, indicting Norman for actions committed before July 1998 
violated the principle of null em crimen sine lege. 
43. See Trial of German Major War Criminals (Goering et al.), International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentence, Sept. 30 and Oct. 1, 1946 (Cmd 6964, HMSO, 
202 
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Applying the blueprint through which Nuremberg criminalized crimes against 
humanity to the recruitment of child soldiers, Norman thus begins to align 
international criminal law with general international human rights protections and 
common law domestic provisions regarding the abuse of children.44 
C. Head o/State Immunity 
The Special Court's third foundational decision concerns head-of-state 
immunity (HOSI). On May 31,2004, the Special Court rejected former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor's preliminary motion45 to the Court seeking an order to 
quash his indictment on immunity grounds.46 Taylor's counsel had deposited the 
motion with the Special Court on July 23, 2003, some weeks after Chief 
Prosecutor David Crane had "unveiled" the indictment and circulated an 
international arrest warrant while Taylor, then still Liberia's Head of State, was in 
nearby Ghana. (Taylor was in Ghana ostensibly to attend peace talks aimed at 
securing a cease-fire between belligerents in Liberia's own civil war.). The 
Special Court indictment accused Taylor of war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law for his role in 
supporting the Revolutionary United Front's activities in Sierra Leone.47 
London); Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 1946,41 A.J.I.L.l72, 
172-333 (1947). 
44. Customary international law explicitly affirnls an individual's right to liberty and security. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states "everyone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each State." (Article 13). Domestic 
provisions punish child abductors the world over. See, e.g. The Criminal Procedure A~t, 
1965 (Sierra Leone) (as amcnded), the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (SIerra 
Leone), and The Malicious Damage Act, 1861) (Sierra Leone). In Canada, kidnapping is 
made punishable by sec. 279 of the Criminal Code; in the US by 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2003). 
Public conscience has been unequivocal in its condemnation of child abuse; in light of such 
clarity, Nonnan's claims of a right to recruit child soldiers seem patently unconvincing. For 
international case law similarly demonstrating the alignment of international human rights 
protections with domestic prohibitions, see Myrna Mack, Case 10.636, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 10/96 and Velasquez Rodriguez Case (Gov't ofHond.), Judgment of July 29, 
1988, Inter-Am. C.lI.R., Report No.4, Ser. C. 
45. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I-018 (65-102), Applicant's Motion 
Made Under Protest and Without Waiving ofhmmmity Accord.:d to a Head of State 
President Charles Ghankay Taylor Requesting that the Trial Chamber Do Quash to Said 
Approved Indictment of 7th Mar. 2003, available at http://www.sc-
sl.orglDocuments/SCSL-03-0 1-1-059 .pdf. 
46. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-0 I-I (30314-3039), Decision on 
Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-0 1-1-059 .pdf. 
47. See Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003), 
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/. 
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According to Taylor's motion, his indictment "violat[ed] the criminal immunity 
of the Head of the Sovereign State of the Republic of Liberia President Charles 
Ghankay Taylor contrary to customary international law as recognized by the 
jurisprudence of the International Court ofJustice."48 Taylor, it is undisputed, was 
the President of Liberia at all times referenced in the indictment; meaning that he 
was still 'Head of State' when his counsel deposited the preliminary motion 
pleading HOSI on his behalf.49 Taylor argued that HOSI is relinquished only when 
a State affirmatively ratifies a treaty such as the Rome Statute that effectively 
penetrates Heads of State immunity.50 
The tribunal rejected Taylor's argument and found that the Special Court has 
proper jurisdiction over him.51 The Taylor decision is rooted in the dual 
conclusion that jurisdiction was the intention of the Security Council, and that 
Heads of State are not immune before international tribunals. 52 
The Indictment naming Taylor surprised no one involved with the Special 
Court. Indeed, Article 6(2) of the Court's statute was drafted with Taylor in mind 
and provides simply that "[t]he official person of any accused persons, whether as 
Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not 
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.,,53 The 
Court succinctly recongized that, by entering into the treaty that created the 
tribunal, the Security Council imbued the Special Court with the power to try 
Taylor. 
StilI, Taylor's motion was buttressed by the precedent enshrined in Democratic 
Republic o/Congo v. Belgium ("Yerodia case,,).54 There, the International Court of 
Justice upheld the immunity of the DRC's Foreign Minister Yerodia in the national 
courts of another sovereign, Belgium, on the grounds that customary international 
law afforded no exception to the immunity afforded a sitting Minister, even where 
that person is suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against 
humanity.55 
The Taylor decision dcparts from Yerodia by insisting that the Special Court is 
48. Id. at 68. 
49. Id. 
50. See generally Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I-018 (3014-39) 
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Doculllcnts/SCSL-03-01-1-059.pdf. 
51. Id. 
52. This paper wiII focus on the sccond part of this decision; the intentions of the Security 
Council are bcyond the scope of the argument presented here. 
53. Statute of the Special Court, supra note 25, art. 6(2). 
54. Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Oem. Rep. Congo v. Bclg.), 2002 I.C,). 3 (Feb. 14). 
55. Id. at sec. 58. 
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not an organ of Sierra Leone's judiciary, but rather an independent international 
criminal tribuna1.56 The Taylor Court's reasoning is consistent with the Kalloll 
decision and distinguishes between obligations in municipal law and the creation 
of an international institution. Noting that, although the Special Court was 
established by an Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone 
persuant to Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) rather than the exercise of 
Chapter VII powers,57 the Court found that the Security Council's powers were 
broad enough to encompass the creation of an international tribunal.58 The Court 
also held that the SCSL "has the characteristics associated with classical 
international organisations (including legal personality; the capacity to enter into 
agreements with other international persons governed by international law; 
privileges and irnmunites; and an autonomous will distinct from that of its 
members).,,59 
In so finding, the Court explicitly groups the SCSL with the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, the Special 
Court's legal authority derives from a considerably different source than that of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's jurisdiction over then 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic,60 and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda's jurisdiction over former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda.61 
The ICTY and ICTR were created by the Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter. The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals provide that 
official immunity shall not relieve a person of criminal responsibilitl2 and oblige 
56. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I-OIS (3014-3039), at paragraph 40; 
available al http://www.sc-sl.orglDocumems/SCSL-03-01-1-059.pdf. 
57. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N.Doc. S/RESIl315 (Aug. 14,2000). 
58. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia detennined that 
not only was the Security Council able to create an International Criminal Tribunal, but also 
that such a move was "an entirely appropriate reaction to a situation in which international 
peace is clearly endangered." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the 
Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, sec. 27 (Aug. 10, 1995). As authorized by Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, specifically article 39, the Security Council may "detern1ine the existence 
of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and ... decide what measures 
shall be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security." !d. § 21. 
59. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-0 I-I (30314-3039), Decision on 
Immunity from Jurisdiction, sec. 41(b) (May 31, 2004). 
60. Prosecutor v. Milosevic. Case No. IT-99-37-I, Decision on Review ofIndictment and 
Application for Consequential Orders, sec. 2 (May 24, 1999). 
61. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998). 
62. Article 7(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia 
and Article 6(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda both read: 
"The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as 
a responsible Government oflicial, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
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all states to cooperate with, assist and comply with requests of the two tribullals.63 
As Mora Johnson has observed, the coercive powers of Chapter VII require States 
to disregard any potential legal prohibition under customary international law 
against the arrest and surrender off-leads of State, given that Articles 25 and 103 of 
the U.N. Charter compel States to carry out decisions of the Security Council, even 
when these conflict with other obligations under intemationallaw.(>-l Ghana's 
refusal to arrest Taylor underscored the fact that, unlike the Chapter VII progeny, 
the Special Court lacks the authority to compel third parties to effectuate its arrest 
warrants since non-State Parties to a treaty are generally not bound by its 
provisions. 
The Taylor decision recognizes that the treaty between the United Nations and 
the Government of Sierra Leone, creating the Special Court pursuant to a Security 
Council resolution, confers international characteristics on the tribunal. As a non-
domestic tribunal, the Special Court joins a new category of institutions, including 
the International Criminal Court,65 whose statutes provide that official capacity 
(including that of a Head of State) shall not exempt a person from individual 
criminal responsibility.66 
Plainly, the fact that the Government of Sierra Leone contracted with the 
United Nations - as opposed to another state or a regional organization-
influenced the Taylor Court. The tribunal finds that the treaty creating the Special 
nor mitigate punishment." Statute of the Intemational Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner 
Yugoslavia, art. 7(2), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY]; Statute of the 
Intemational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(2), Nov. 8, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1602 
[hereinatier ICTRj. 
63. ICTY, supra note 63, art. 29; ICTR, slipra note 63, art. 28. 
64. Many scholars have argued that consent was obtained by Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
"indirectly" for the ICTY and ICTR respectively when these States acceded to the U.N. 
Charter, at which time they agreed to respect binding decisions of the Security Council. 
Conversely, Mora Johnson argued that consent is not necessarily required by countries to 
try their war criminals - including Heads of State (Unpublished article on file with author.) 
65. Rome Statute of the Intemational Criminal Court, opened for signa/lire July 17, 1998, 21Si 
U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002, [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
66. Article 27 of the Rome Statute reads: "(1) This Statute shal1 apply equal1y to a\l persons 
without any distinction bascd on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head 
of State ... shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute. 
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. (2) Immunities or 
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether 
under national or intcrnational law shaH not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction 
over such a person." Jd. art. 27. See also Article 6(2) of the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Lcone, which reads, "The official person of any accused persons, whether as He3d of 
Stat.: or Governmcnt or as a responsible government official, shall not relie\'e such person 
of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishmcnt." Statute of the Special Court, slIpm 
note 26, art. 6(2). 
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Court includes the United Nations as the embodiment of the international 
community.67 "The Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone," the 
Court noted "is thus an agreement between all members of the United Nations and 
Sierra Leone.,,68 The Chamber's finding that the Special Court is an international 
institution is supported by the reality that the tribunal is funded entirely by foreign 
sources, and by the fact that its statute explicitly confronts the possibility of 
prosecuting United Nations peacekeepers.69 
As precedent, the Court's finding also repudiates Taylor's argument that Head 
of State immunity is erga omnes, that it exists in all fora, including international 
tribunals, and can be penetrated only if the State of which the accused is Head 
consents in some manner.70 Just as the trial of Milosevic confirmed that 
international criminal law no longer recognizes absolute head of state immunity 
before international fora, the Taylor decision contributes to the demise of that 
defense before hybrid institutions as well. 
IV. A Message To Africa 
Taken together, these three cases contain particular resonance for Africa. 
The Sierra Leonean experiment in transitional criminal justice operates in a 
context familiar to many African states: a violent civil war involving local and 
foreign actors, an underdeveloped post-colonial judiciary, big man or cult-figure 
politics, abject poverty and a history of impunity for state-sponsored persecution. 
Past failures to deliver justice or the perception of justice have eroded the mle of 
law and the domestic legal order remains ill-equipped to address the nation's 
violent history. Article 5 of the Special Court's statute, for instance, imports the 
1926 Sierra Leonean law on sexual assault creating three categories of offenses 
corresponding to the age of the victim - a vestige of outmoded thinking related to 
sexual maturity that is seen as so flawed that the Prosecutor has refused to indict 
67. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, SCSL-2003-0 I-I (30314-3039), Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, '138 (May 31,2004). . . 
68. Compare id. and Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, Case No.SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), DeCISIOn 
on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty, '142 (Mar. 13,2004), available at 
http://www.sc-sl.orgiDocuments/SCSL-04-15-PT -060-I.pdf and http://www.sc-
sl.orglDocumentslSCSL-04-15-PT-060-II.pdf. (The Court's determination in Taylor. 
contrasts with its finding in the Lome Amnesty Accord case which finds that the Lome 
Agreement constituted a peace accord between two domestic factions that had force and 
effect solely in the domestic courts of Sierra Leone.) 
69. See Statute of the Special Court, supra note 26, at art. 1. 
70. See Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, SCSL-2003-0 I-I (30314-3039), '117 (citing the amiclls 
curiae submission by professor Phillipe Sands from Oct. 23, 2003). 
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suspects under the Article.71 
What role then does the Special Court's jurispmdence play for societies that 
have virtually no experience with competent courts, much less organizcd judicial 
reckoning for mass crimes? In recent ycars, advocatcs for criminal accountability 
have made three broad claims in support of trials. First, they arguc that trials scnd 
a signal to would-be perpetrators that they will bc held individually accountablc for 
their actions. Justice for past crimes, advocates for intcrnational prosecutions 
reason, supplies the legal foundation needed to dctcr futurc atrocitics.72 Second, 
trials are meant to strengthen the mle oflaw "by teaching all scgmcnts of society 
that the the appropriate means of rcsolving conflict is through impartial justicc.',73 
Third, criminal trials emphasize the guilt of individuals and de stigmatize cthnic 
groups or state agents as a whole, thereby defusing the potential for futurc cycles 
of violence.74 
The Special Court's pivitol achievement has been the interpretation and 
adaptation of these justifications for the Sierra Leonean context. Specifically, the 
Court has (i) focused its attention on the subjects of child soldiers, amnesties and 
head of state immunity - all issues that plague modem African states, (ii) dismpted 
traditional power relations by offering a form of selective retribution, and (iii) 
employed comparative case law and the tribunal's hybrid stmcture to 
internationalize the Court's legacy while strengthening the capacity of Sierra 
Leone's jUdiciary. 
A. Addressing Africa's Problems 
To begin, the Court's early decisions encapSUlate human rights dilemmas 
central to many African states. In countries like Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Bumndi, 
to say nothing of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda - where 
the ICC has commenced investigations - the Special Court's findings on the 
plague of child soldiers, the effect of amnesties and head of state immunity may 
have significant legal and political application. 
Sierra Leone, like many other African states, experienced the widespread and 
71. See Statute of the Special Court, supra note 26, at art. 5. 
72. See Human Rights Watch: International Justice, http://hrw.org/justice/about.htm (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2006). 
73. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 28-30 (2000). 
74. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials alld Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in 
Strategies 0/ International Justice, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 17 (2004) (citing Neil J. 
Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review o/Accountability Mechanislll~j;Jr Mass 
Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., 127 (1997». 
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systematic usc of child soldiers in armed conflict. At a time when child soldiers 
arc routinely conscripted into military service in numerous countries75 and many 
non-governmental organizations dedicate programs to stopping the use of child 
soldiers in armed confliet,7(, the Norman decision creates the possibility of the first 
international conviction associated with this practice. The timing of the Spccial 
Court's decision is particularly fortuitous because the International Criminal 
Court's (ICC) first state referral relatcs to crimcs committed in Northern Uganda 
by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and other fighting forces, many of which 
involve grave human rights abuses by and toward children.77 According to human 
rights reports, the LRA has institutionalized the practice of kidnapping children, 
turning victims into victimizers and pennanently destroying the fabric of family 
life.n Article 8 subsections (2)(b)(xxvi) and (e)(vii) of the ICC's Rome Statute 
bring the crime of conscripting or enlisting children under fifteen within the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. 79 The vehement condemnation ofthe 
practice in the Special Court's holding provides an authoritative interpretation of 
the crime at the time of the ICC Prosecutor's investigation. As case law, the 
Nonnan decision now aligns international criminal precedent with a host of 
international treaties that prohibit the practice of recruiting child soldiers.80 
75. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIIILD SOLDIER USE 2003: A BRIEFING FOR THE 4TII UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL OPEN DEBATE ON CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT (Jan. 2004), 
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004lchildsoldiersO I 04/childsoldiers. pdf. 
76. E.g., the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, which unites national, regional and 
international organizations and networks in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the 
Middle East and "works to prevent the recruitment and use of children as soldiers, to secure 
their demobilization and to ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration into society." See 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, http://www.child-soldiers.org/(lastvisitedAug. 
27,2006). 
77. See Press Release, In!'1 Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning 
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to thc ICC (Jan. 29,2004), ami/able at http://www.icc-
cpLint/pressrelease _ dctails&id= l6.html. 
78. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STOLEN CHILDREN: ABDUCTION AND RECRUITMENT IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA 2, Mar. 2003, available at 
http://hrw.org!reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda0403.pdf; AMNESTY INT'L, "BREAKING 
GOD'S COMMANDS": THE DESTRUCTION OF CHILDHOOD BY THE LORD'S RESISTANCE 
ARMY, Sept. 18, 1997, avai/able at 
http://wcb.amncsty.org!library/pdf/AFR5900 11997ENG LISHlSFilel AFR5900 197 .pdf. 
79. Incremental legal developments of this kind are welcomed and anticipated by Article \0 of 
the ICC statute which states that "[nJothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or 
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other 
than this Statute." Rome Statute, supra note 66, at art. 10. 
80. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection ofVietims of Non-Intemationa I Anned Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8,1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609; The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20,1989,1577 
U.N.T.S. 3; Rome Statute, supra note 66, at art. 21 (I )(b); Convention Concerning the 
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Similarly, the Special Court's Kallon decision limits the effect of domestic 
amnesties and will embolden future African prosecutors to charge suspects with 
jus cogens offenses, notwithstanding domestic guarantees. Amnesties, of course, 
are a defining piece of the transitional justice landscape and the pursuit of justice 
and reconciliation in the wake of violent contlict is frequently constrained by the 
outgoing regime's grant of amnesties and pardons to perpetrators.SI In such 
circumstances, it would be exceedingly dangerous for the successor regime to 
disrupt the amnesty as the new leaders in Chad, Mozambique and elsewhere have 
discovered. 
Kallan offers a way out of this predicament by suggesting that future 
international or hybrid prosecutions are not necessarily impeded by domestic 
political decisions. Equally important, Kallon joins Azapo as a considered 
deliberation on the validity of African amnesties. In Azapo, a group of prominent 
victims - including Stephen Biko's family - argued that amnesty violated the 
constitutional right to have "justiciable disputes settled by a court of law."s3 There, 
the South African Constitutional Court accepted the principle of conditional 
amnesties (the perpetrator's testimony in exchange for a promise not to prosecute) 
as a path to reparations for victims and as a basis for promoting the truth. The 
Court reasoned that the "carrot and stick" approach of amnesty and prosecution 
provided an important incentive to admit past violations which might otherwise 
remain unknown, stating "[w]ith that incentive, what might unfold are objectives 
fundamental to the ethos of a new constitutional order.,,82 Additionally, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) was designed to provide 
victims with an opportunity to discover the truth regarding past abuses and to 
promote a dialogue aimed at converting individual anger and grief into a national 
understanding necessary for reconciliation. 
The truth commission envisioned in the Lome Accord offered few of the 
guarantees contained in the SATRC and was widely viewed as a tool for securing 
peace at the expense of justice. Juxtaposed with Azapo, the Special Court's 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
(LL.D. Convention 182), June 17, 1999,38 LL.M. 1207; Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 
May 25, 2000, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. NRES/54/263 (2000). 
81. See, e.g. , LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH 
TORTURERS (1990); Priscilla B. Hayner, Fijieen Tn/til Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A 
Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (J 994); MARSHALL FREEMAN HARRIS, MAKING 
JUSTICE WORK: THE REpORT OF THE CENTURY FOUNDATJONrrWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 
TASK FORCE ON APPREHENDING INDICATED WAR CRIMINALS (1998). 
82. Id. at 39. 
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decision in Kallon provides an illustration of an amnesty process insufficient to bar 
subsequent international prosecution and helps to define the criteria for amnesties 
that wiJI be honored.83 
Lastly, the Special Court's jurisdictional decision in Taylor offers hope to 
Africans living under despotic mle that their leaders are not above the law. Human 
Rights Watch reports serious human rights abuses committcd by the leadership in 
no fewer than thirteen African states. 84 The Special Court's decision is the clearest 
expression to date of the new criminal law principle that sitting heads of state 
enjoy no immunity for violations of international humanitarian law. 
The implications for Zimbabweans living under Robert Mugabe's tyranny are 
uncertain. However, to the extent that the Pinochet proceedings and the trial of 
Saddam Hussein stand for the proposition that former head of state status no longer 
offers immunity from domestic criminal prosecution, Taylor joins the Milosevic 
precedent in affirming that head of state immunity will not bar prosecution before 
international tribunals.85 In so doing, the decision forecloses the perverse legal 
calculus that abusive leaders may avoid prosecution by refusing to relinquish 
power.86 
B. The Power ami Limits of Punishment 
The cumulative message of the Special Court's jurisdictional decisions is that 
the tribunal exists to prosecute individuals, determine guilt and imprison convicted 
human rights abusers. Neither the llullem crimen sine lege arguments offered by 
Norman's counsel, the domestic amnesty excuse nor the head of state immunity 
defense stands as a bar to prosecution. The expressive value of these cases defines 
a place for criminal sanctions bounded by the mle of law and within an emerging 
83. For Sierra Leone final tmth commission report, see Official Website of Sierra Leone's Tmth 
& Reconciliation Commission Report, http://www.trcsierraleone.org(lastvisitedApr.15. 
2006). 
84. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2006: EVENTS OF 2005,74 - 154 (2006), 
available al http://www.hrw.org/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf(referring specifically to Angola, 
Bumndi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria. 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). 
85. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. ICTY -99-37 (Kosovo); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case 
No. ICTY -0 I-50 (Croatia); Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. ICTY -01-51 (Bosnia). 
86. See Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 221 (2nd Cir. 2004) (affinning the dismissal 
of a civil suit against Robert Mugabe and other scnior Zimbabwean gowmmcnt officials 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act for reasons of diplomatic immunity but declining to reach 
the question of whether Head of State Imlllunity applies to Mugabe under the terms of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
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tradition of transitional justice. 87 As Ruti Teitcl acknowledges, conventional 
understandings of punishment and individual accountability are adapted in 
transitional circumstances and often hinge on selcctive and largely symbolic 
prosecutions ofindividuals.88 The Special Court's first cases have found a wholly 
appropriate group of defendants to fulfill that function. 
Africa does not lack for criminal punishment. What is missing, all too often, is 
a sense of constrained, impartial justice that acts to identify certain conduct as 
worthy of criminal sanction. Built on a foundation provided by a statute and rules 
of procedure that ensure the presumption of innocence and due process,89 the 
Special Court's first decisions confirm both the resolve and the limits of the of the 
tribunal's reach. Taylor is indictable because he stands as one of the kakatua and 
because the Court was designed to prosecute such figures,9o not because he's 
readily arrestable. 
To be sure, the Special Court's clarity of mission was aided by the parallel 
operation of a truth commission. Likewise, the United Nations Mission for Sierra 
Leone, not the court, addresses the goal of restoring order and preventing future 
atrocities. Contrary to the experience of the ICTY, the Special Court has avoided 
unwarranted "mission creep" by pledging to prosecute only "those who bear the 
greatest responsibility" for the abuses committed in Sierra Leone.91 This built-in 
limit is dictated by budgetary realities but it is consistent with the emerging 
doctrine of command responsibility.92 Likewise, the limited number of accused 
will ensure that the theatrc of prosecution is reserved for the worst offenders. This 
concentrated focus serves to manage expectations, a process reinforced by the 
Special Court's exhaustive outreach efforts which aim to educate the people of 
Sierra Leone about the power and limits of the Special Court. To date, the Office 
of the Prosecutor has publicly indicted only eleven persons, grouping nine of them 
87. For more on the expressive function oflaw, see Cass R. Sunstein, 011 the E'(pressive 
Flinction o/Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2023 (1996). 
88. See generally TEITEL, supra note 74. 
89. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (2005), Rule 
33(c), available at htlp:llwww.sc-s1.orglrulesofprocedureandevidence.pdf. 
90. Statute of the Special Court specifically states: "[tlhe official position of any accused 
persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, 
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment." Statute of 
the Special Court, supra note 26, at art. 6(2). 
91. Id. at art. 1. 
92. See Ford ex reI. Estate ofFord v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (I tth Cir. 2002); Greg Vetter, 
Command Responsibility 0/ Non-Milital)' Superiors ill the International Crimillal Court, 25 
YALE J. INT'L L. 89 (2000). 
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together in three major trials.'H 
Where cases have advanced, thc Court has been careful to limit its reach to the 
architects of atrocitiesY4 The prosecution of Taylor, Nonnan, Kallon and Kamara 
signals the assignment of responsibility to individuals in positions of authority. 
The arrest of many of these figures provides a form of specific deterrence by 
removing feared individuals from the post-war political equation. While surely a 
less robust form of deterrence than the general criminal law threat of sanction, 
prosecution of individual warlords provides hope that their incarceration will 
prevent a resumption of war. 
Additionally, the prosecution communicates real and symbolic retribution for 
ghastly crimes.95 With the exception of scaled indictments,'J6 virtually every 
element of the Special Court's work has been public. The Court will attempt to 
learn from mistakes committed at the ICTR with respect to witness protection and 
the treatment of victims on the stand,97 but like the preliminary motions in Taylor, 
Norman and Kalloll, all hearings will take place at the Special Court's courthouse 
and arc open to the pUblic. The courthouse includes a dock for criminals and the 
opportunity for victims and their families to sec the defendants in person.98 
93. Indictments against two other persons werc withdrawn in December 2003 due to the deaths 
of the accused and Johnny Paul Koroma remains at large. Charles Taylor was indicted on 7 
March 2003 on 17 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious 
violations of intemational humanitarian law. The indictmcnt was amended on 16 March 
2006 to II counts. Taylor was taken into custody by the Special Court on 29 March 2006. 
His initial appearance took place on 3 April 2006. (See Special Court for Sierra Leone 
website section on Taylor case, available at http://www.sc-sl.orgrraylor.html.) 
94. In a much-publicized announcement, Chief Prosecutor David Crane declared that he would 
not prosecute any suspects who were under the age of eighteen at the time the alleged 
offenses occurred. As reported by the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, Crane announced, "[t]he children of Sierra Leone have suffered enough both as 
victims and perpetrators. I am not interested in prosecuting children. I want to prosecute 
the people who forced thousands of children to commit unspeakable crimes." Reported by 
IRINNEWS.ORG, Sierra Leone: Special COllrt Will Not Indict Children, Nov. 4, 2002, 
available at 
http://www.irinnews.orgireport.asp?ReportlD=30752&SelcctRegion=West_Africa&Select 
Country=SIERRA LEONE. 
95. Martha Minow refers to the prosecutory impulse in post-conflict societies as a healthy fom1 
of vengeance. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEAl'CE AND FORGIVENESS (1998). 
96. In June 2003, the Special Court unsealed its indictml'nt of Charles Taylor, sparking a chain 
of events during the summer of 2003 which culminated in Taylor's resignation and 
departure from Liberia. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, 
Indictment (Mar. 7,2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.orglDocuments/SCSL-03-01-I-
75.pdf. 
97. See Samantha Power, Rwanda: the Two Faces oj'.Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 16,2003, 
available at http://www.nybooks.coIllfarticlcsfanicle-preview?articlc _id= 15982. 
98. For more infom1ation about the inner workings of the Spccial Court, see HUMAN RIGHTS 
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For the rest of Africa, the trinity of Special Court decisions paves the way for 
some of Sierra Leone's kakatua to be humbled publicly and stripped of their aura 
of invincibility. The assignment of individual responsibility and the naming of 
wrongdoers are particularly critical as the legal resolution of a conflict 
characterized by both informal hierarchies and the power of state-controlled 
armies. Even as the Special Court stays the hand of vengeance against those who 
amputated limbs, the early cases reveal a concerted effort to judge, punish and 
shame several of the worst human rights abusers in modern African history. 
C. Balancing the Intematiollal alld the Domestic 
The final achievement of the Court's first cases is the effective balancing of 
international and local elements within an institutional apparatus that promises a 
fully hybrid structure. The challenge underlying much of the Special Court's work 
is to reinforce municipal and international sources of law, through the work of 
Sierra Leonean and international lawyers and judges. Hybrid processes, sitting in 
the country where their work is readily apparent to the victims, witnesses and 
defendants' families, address at least three theoretical concerns associated with 
purely international or purely domestic processes: problems of legitimacy, 
capacity-building, and norm development. 99 The first cases are translating the 
theory into practice. 
Sierra Leone's recent history works in favor of hybrid proceedings. The court's 
personal jurisdiction encompasses both Sierra Lconcans - the bulk ofthc 
defendants - and foreigners, particularly Charles Taylor. And the victims the Court 
aims to serve include Sierra Leoneans and the 500 U.N. peacekeepcrs taken 
hostage toward the end of hostilities. 
The crimes of universal jurisdiction the Court sits to adjudicate - torture, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes - are equally amenable to prosecution in a hybrid 
tribunal. Indeed, in thc absence of a domestic court capable of addressing the 
magnitude of offenses, a Section VII-authorized tribunal, or the ICC, a hybrid 
court may be the most appropriate institutional response. For the many African 
states that are not a party to the ICC - Zimbabwe and Liberia among them - and 
lack the judicial capacity or political will to for war crimes trials, the Special Court 
represents international accountability in a domestic setting. 
WATCH, JUSTICE IN MOTION: THE TRIAL PHASE OF TilE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA 
LEONE, Nov. 200S, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/200S/sierralconcIIOS/sicnaleonc II OSwcover.pdf. 
99. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise 0/ Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 300 (2003). 
214 
Speaking to Africa 215 
Each of the Court's jurisdictional decisions addresses hybridity explicitly or 
implicity. Kerflon and Taylor endorse the international character of the Special 
Court in arenas previously reserved for domestic resolution, the effect of amnesties 
and the immunity generally afforded one sovereign in the courts of another. By 
invoking both comparative domestic law and international criminal precedent, the 
Special Court breathes life into a new category of tribunal. 100 As such, one might 
suggest that the Special Court is engaged in an increasingly popular fonn of 
transnational judicial dialogue. 101 Even Norman, which is addressed to the impact 
of international customary law, should act to strengthen Sierra Leone's 
prohibitions of kidnapping, slavery, sexual assault, and child abuse within the 
country's Commonwealth common law tradition. 102 
At the level of process too, these decisions are the product of the involvement of 
both domestic and international (including Pan-African) communities.103 In the 
Taylor case, for example, the African Bar Association (ABA) filed an amicus 
brief addressing the validity of the indictment. Citing United States of America v. 
Noriega, the Pinochet cases, the Milosevic precedent, the Rome Statute and 
declarations of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, the ABA submitted 
that Taylor cannot enjoy immunity for international crimes alleged to have been 
committed by him in Sierra Leone. I04 
Hybridity - the infusion of foreign resources, expertise and law into the 
domestic criminal realm - is appealing for poor states in Africa. On a continent 
characterized by extreme poverty, arbitrary colonial boundaries and 
100. Examples of this engagement between international and domestic jurisdictions include the 
decision on amnesties in the Ka!lon and Taylor cases, and the building of international law 
upon domestic legal foundations with respect to the protection of children in the Norman 
case. 
101. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (J 996); 
Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transjudicial Dialogue in 
Creating and EnforCing Intemational Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487,492 (2005) ("[C]ourts are 
engaging each other out of a developing sense that they are part of a common enterprise"). 
102. E.g., The Criminal Procedure Act, 1965 (Sierra Leone) (as amended), the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Sierra Leone), and The Malicious Damage Act, 1861 (Sierra 
Leone). 
103. Notice, for example, the close resemblance between the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone and the letter sent by Human Rights Watch that makes recommendations for 
the Special Court. Statute of the Special Court, supra note 26; Letter from Peter 
Takirambudde, Executive Dir., Afr. Div., Human Rights Watch, and Richard Dicker, Dir., 
Int'I Justice Program, Human Rights Watch, to Laila Stenseng, Second Sec'y, Permanent 
Mission of Norway to the United Nations (Mar. 7, 2002), available at 
http://hrw.org!press/2002/03/slcone0307-ltr.pdf. 
104. See Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL 03-01-1-059, Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, '119 (May 31,2004). 
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underdeveloped judiciaries, the usc of international law to strengthen local or 
customary institutions will almost certainly assist accountability efforts. In this 
regard, the Special Court's first cases, issued in a building that will remain in 
Freetown by a cadre of local staff: remind Sierra Leone that it is not alone. 
V. Conclusion 
The Special Court is a single accountability mechanism with modest goals. Its 
value, however, is best measured practically and symbolically. In each regard, the 
Special Court's first cases speak to the problems of Africa as a whole. By 
condemning the usc of child soldiers, eschewing aboslute immunity and limiting 
the effect of amensties, the Court has established itself as an indispensible clement 
of transitional justice and an institution capable of shaping the legal future of 
Sierra Leone as well as its neighbors. 
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